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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The subject lawsuit represents one lawsuit in a long string of complex litigation 
commenced by Plaintiff Reed Taylor. In this case, following unsuccessful litigation against AlA 
Services to recover for AlA's payment default, Taylor is now suing AlA's attorneys, Defendants 
Richard Riley and the Estate of Robert M. Turnbow and their then law firm, Eberle, Berlin, 
Kading, Turnbow and McKlveen, Chartered. In this litigation, Taylor's remaining cause of 
action is for professional legal malpractice. Specifically, nearly twelve years after Attorneys 
Riley and Turnbow authored an Opinion Letter as part of a Stock Redemption Agreement 
between Riley's and Turnbow's client, AlA Services and Taylor, Taylor alleges that Riley and 
Turnbow owed him a legal duty, even though Taylor was not in an attorney-client relationship 
with the attorneys, and that the breach of this alleged duty proximately damaged Taylor. 
B. Concise Statement of Facts 
The pending litigation arose out of a corporate transaction occurrmg m 1995. 
Specifically, in 1995, AlA Services Corporation ("AlA"), an Idaho corporation, sought to redeem 
6l3,494 shares of the common stock of AlA held by its majority shareholder, Plaintiff Reed J. 
Taylor ("Taylor"). R., p. 269, 11. 4-7. Reed Taylor founded AIA a..'1d, prior to 1995, ovvned the 
majority of AlA's common stock. Id. In 1995, Reed Taylor was serving as the president of AlA 
and was chairman of its Board of Directors. R., p. 2153. 
Taylor retained Attorneys Scott Bell and Frank Taylor and their Seattle law firm, 
Cairncross & Hernpelrnann, P.S. to negotiate and draft the relevfult agreements necessary to 
redeem Taylor's AlA stock, in early 1995. R., p. 2153 and p.l835. After Taylor retained Bell, it 
was Attorney Bell's responsibility to negotiate, draft agreements and close the redemption 
transaction. Id. Of note, during the entire time of the negotiations between Taylor and AlA for 
the redemption of Taylor's AlA stock, AlA was represented by its own in-house counsel. R., p. 
2153. AlA also engaged Attorneys Richard Riley ("Riley") and Robert M. Turnbow 
("Turnbow" or "Estate of Turnbow") to assist in preparing the documentation needed for the 
redemption transaction. R., p. 2153. In 1995, Riley and Turnbow were members of the Eberle, 
Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chtd. law firm (hereinafter "Eberle Berlin"). R., p. 
2153. Attorney Bell provided drafts of the redemption transaction agreements to Riley. R., pp. 
1850-1851. (Transcript of Deposition of Richard Riley, pp. 36, 37, and 42). After months of 
negotiations, on or after July 22, 1995, Taylor signed a Stock Redemption Agreement, Stock 
Pledge Agreement, Security Agreement and other ancillary agreements to redeem his shares of 
AlA stock. R., pp. 2153-2156 and pp. 2172-2243. 
Significantly, based on advice from his attorney, Scott Bell, Taylor conditioned the 
redemption of his AlA stock on AlA obtaining all necessary approvals and consents from all 
shareholders. R., p. 2153 and p. 1837, 11. 12-20. In the course of advising Taylor to enter into 
the Stock Redemption Agreement, Attorney Bell, on behalf of Taylor, requested and required an 
Opinion Letter from Eberle Berlin regarding legal matters sUlTounding the 1995 redemption 
agreement. R., pp. 1850-1851. (Transcript of Deposition of Richard Riley, pp. 36, 48, and 49). 
Attorney Bell had extensive experience in drafting, reviewing and interpreting opinion letters for 
corporate transactions. He negotiated the contents of the Opinion Letter with Attorney Riley. 
R., pp. 1850-1851. (Transcript of Deposition of Richard Riley, pp. 36, 37, 42 48, and 49). 
Attorney Bell also actively participated in the drafting of the Opinion Letter, a letter ultimately 
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signed by Eberle Berlin. Id. Attorney Bell approved the 1995 Opinion Letter as to form and 
substance. R., p. 1837. On August 15, 1995, Eberle Berlin provided the requested Opinion 
Letter to Taylor's attorney, Scott Bell, pursuant to Section 2.50) of the July 22, 1995 Stock 
Redemption Agreement. R., p. 2155 and pp. 2224-228. 
The 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement specifically referenced the Opinion Letter in 
Section 2.50). R., pp. 2154-2155, pp. 2172-2189 and pp. 2224-228. The August 15, 1995 
Opinion Letter addressed only the 1995 Agreements between Taylor and AlA and is limited in 
two important ways. R., pp. 2224-228. The Opinion Letter was limited in time in that the 
representations in the letter were confined to the documents which existed as of the date that the 
Opinion Letter was finalized, August 15, 1995. Id. In the Opinion Letter, Eberle Berlin further 
expressly stated that "[w]e assume no responsibility for updating this opinion to take into 
account any event, action, interpretation or change of law occurring subsequent to the date hereof 
[August 15, 1995] that may affect the validity of any opinions expressed herein." Id. 
After Taylor and his attorney, Scott Bell, received and reviewed Eberle Berlin's August 
15, 1995 Opinion Letter, Taylor decided to move forward with the "Closing" of the 1995 Stock 
Redemption Agreement. Of note, the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement expressly provided 
that the Agreement could be terminated after it was signed, but before the Agreement was 
"closed," if, for example, the opinion letter provided by AlA's outside counsel was deemed to be 
unacceptable. R., pp. 2154-2155 and p. 2184. 
After Taylor "closed" on the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, he became upset with 
AlA's contractual performance. Hence, on April 18, 1996, Reed Taylor wrote a letter to the then 
AlA Services' Chairman, R. John Taylor, and demanded payment of monies allegedly owed and 
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gave notice of default based on the terms in the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. R., pp. 
2156-2157 and pp. 2244-2245. Specifically, in his Apri118, 1996 letter, Reed Taylor stated that 
if the defaults on the 1995 Agreements he outlined in his letter were not cured within five days of 
his letter, "he shall have no other recourse other than to exercise all remedies available" and 
would "take legal action to enforce the corporation's obligations." ld. On behalf of AlA 
Services, on April 22, 1996, John Taylor responded to Reed Taylor's letter denying his 
allegations of default. R., p. 2157 and pp. 2246-2249. Thereafter, on April 25, 1996, Plaintiffs 
attorney, Scott Bell, wrote a second letter to AlA outlining the numerous defaults and addressing 
AlA's failure to perform on the 1995 Agreements. R., p. 2157 and pp. 2250-2253. 
In the late spring and early summer of 1996, a series of negotiations between Taylor and 
AlA representatives transpired addressing the alleged defaults under the 1995 Agreements. R., 
pp. 2157-2159 and pp. 2254-2280. During these negotiations, the parties, unsuccessfully, 
attempted to reach a "Forbearance Agreement" and Reed Taylor even attempted to foreclose on 
the "Pledged Collateral" in the 1995 Stock Pledge Agreement. R., pp. 2157-2159 and pp. 2259-
2277. 
Ultimately, Reed Taylor decided not to move forward with "exercising his remedies" or 
"taking legal action" on alleged defaults and breaches of contract of the 1995 Agreements 
despite his threats to the contrary. At this point in time, Taylor had several choices: he could 
have declared the entire unpaid balance due and payable and proceed to judicially enforce the 
Agreement by suing on the amount due or he could have repossessed the pledged stock and sold 
the stock in a commercially reasonable manner. R., pp. 2157-2159 and pp. 2259-2277. 
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Rather, on July 1, 1996, Taylor and ALA entered into a wholly!!£!! contractual 
agreement, entitled the "Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement," in an effort to resolve their 
disputes. R, p. 2162 and pp. 2306-2313. Attorney Bell continued to represent Taylor in 
connection with the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement. R., p. 1838, 1. 1. 
Unambiguously, by its terms, the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement 
superseded and replaced the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. R, pp. 2163-2164 and pp. 
2306-2313. The 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement specifically provided that 
the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, the Down Pavment Note, the Security Agreement, 
the Stock Pledge Agreement, the Consulting Agreement and the Noncompetition 
Agreement were superseded and "{were] of no further force and effect." Id. Accordingly, 
between 1996 and 2007, the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement was the binding 
contractual agreement between Taylor and ALA. 
Additionally, and of great significance to this lawsuit, Attorney Bell did not, as he had 
done with the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, request or require an opinion letter from 
Eberle Berlin regarding any aspect of the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement. R, p. 
2164. Consequently, Eberle Berlin did not draft or author an Opinion Letter regarding any 
aspect of the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement. Id. Likewise, and contrary to 
what happened in 1995, no opinion letter was requested to close the 1996 Stock Redemption 
Restructure Agreement and no opinion letter was referenced in the 1996 Stock Redemption 
Restructure Agreement. 
Over a decade later, unhappy with ALA's contractual performance in 2007, filed 
suit against ALA alleging a variety of causes of action, including breach of contract Nez Perce 
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County in Idaho (Taylor v. AlA Services, et al., Case No. CV07-00208, the "AlA litigation"). R., 
p.2168. In the course the AlA litigation, Taylor amended his Complaint five times. R., p. 2168. 
In the AlA litigation, Taylor pled breach of contract in his Fifth Amended Complaint based on 
the terms of the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement and sought enforcement of the 
duties and obligation owing under the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement. R, pp. 
2168-2169 and p. 2409. 
In 2009, while Taylor's lawsuit against AlA for breach of contract arising from the 1996 
Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement was on-going, he filed a lawsuit against Defendants 
Richard Riley, Hawley Troxell, Robert Turnbow and Eberle Berlin for professional malpractice 
based on their respective representations in the August 15, 1995 Opinion Letter, which was 
included in the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. R, pp. 25-50. 
In 2012, Taylor then filed suit against Attorneys Scott Bell and Frank Taylor and their 
Seattle law firm, Caimcross & Hempelmann, P.S. for professional malpractice in King County in 
the Superior Court of the State of Washington (Taylor v. Scott Bell, et al., Case No. 12-2-10806-
3 SEA, the "Washington litigation"). R., p. 2169 and pp. 1839-1841. In his Washington 
litigation, Taylor specifically alleged that Attorney Bell and Attorney Taylor breached the 
applicable standards of care by, among things, failing to obtain an opinion letter irom AlA's 
counsel in 1996 in their course of representation of Taylor when he entered into the 1996 Stock 
Redemption Restructure Agreement. R., pp. 1837-1838. Reed Taylor's "Washington litigation 
against Attorney Bell and Attorney Taylor for their alleged failure to obtain and/or require an 
opinion letter from Eberle Berlin on the legality and enforceability of the 1996 Stock 
Redemption Restructure Agreement highlighted the inconsistencies in his positions. Taylor's 
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Washington litigation also makes it undisputedly clear that Eberle Berlin had no involvement in 
opining on any aspect of the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement. 
C. Course of Proceedings Below 
Taylor filed this Idaho lawsuit on October 1, 2009 in Ada County alleging five counts, 
including negligent misrepresentations and professional malpractice against Attorneys Richard 
Riley and Robert Turnbow and the law firms of Hawley Troxell Ennis and Hawley, LLP and 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turbow and McKleveen, Chartered. R., p. 25. After filing answers, 
Riley and Hawley Troxell filed their motion for summary judgment. R., p. 90. In support of 
their motion, Riley and Hawley Troxell lodged a written memorandum (R., p. 785), and filed the 
Affidavits of Gary D. Babbitt (R., pp. 114-561) and Richard A. Riley (R., pp. 562-784). 
Similarly, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin also filed their motion for summary judgment. R., p. 810. 
In support of their motion, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin lodged a written memorandum (R., p. 
904), and filed the Affidavit of Stanley J. Tharp (R., pp. 901-903). 
Relevant to the appellate issues on summary judgment, Riley, Hawley Troxell, Turnbow 
and Eberle Berlin asked the district court to: (1) dismiss Taylor's cause of action for negligent 
misrepresentation as that cause of action is not a recognized cause of action in Idaho against an 
attorney or law firm, a."'1d (2) dismiss Taylor's cause of action for professional malpractice as 
neither Riley nor Turnbow had the requisite attorney-client relationship with Taylor and as a 
matter of law did not owe Taylor a legal duty. R., pp. 785-809 and pp. 904-933. Riley and 
Hawley Troxell also asked the district court to dismiss Taylor's complaint under the doctrine of 
res judicata. R., pp. 791-797. 
7 
In opposition to Riley and Hawley Troxell's motions for summary judgment, Taylor 
lodged a statement of facts (R., p. 1463) and written memorandum (R., p. 1488) on February 19, 
2010. In opposition to Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's motions for summary judgment, Taylor 
lodged a separate written memorandum. R, p. 1509. In opposition to the motions, Taylor also 
filed the Affidavit of Counsel Roderick C. Bond. R, pp. 1039-1460. After filing two response 
memorandums in opposition the motions, Taylor filed three additional oppositions to the 
motions: a supplemental response in opposition to defendants' motions for summary judgment 
(R., p. 1530), a second supplemental memorandum in opposition to defendants' motions for 
summary judgment (R, p. 1573), and a third supplemental memorandum in opposition to 
defendants' motions for summary judgment (R, p. 1648). 
Riley, Hawley Troxell, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin filed reply memorandums in support 
their motions for summary judgment. R, p. 1592 and p.1612. 
On March 26, 2010, the district court held oral arguments on Riley, Hawley Troxell, 
Turnbow and Eberle Belin's motions for summary judgment and entered a written order granting 
Riley, Hawley Troxell, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's motion for summary judgment on Taylor's 
negligent misrepresentation cause of action. R, pp. 1674-1675. After taking the motions for 
summary judgment with regard Taylor's cause of action for professional malpractice on the 
requisite attorney-client relationship and legal duty under advisement, the district court entered a 
written memorandum decision denying Riley, Hawley Troxell, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's 
motion for summary judgment. ("May 10, 2010 Memorandum Decision and Order re: 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment," R, p. 1677.) The district court held that no 
attorney-client relationship existed between either Riley and Taylor or Turnbow and Taylor, but 
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nevertheless held that Riley and Turnbow owed Taylor, a non-client, a legal duty to draft the 
1995 Opinion Letter in a "non-negligent fashion." R., p. 1684,11. 8-9 and 21-22. In its May 10, 
2010 Order, the district court further held Taylor's claims against Hawley Troxell for 
malpractice based on the allegations in the complaint were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
R., pp. 1682-1683. Thereafter, the district court entered a judgment dismissing all claims against 
Hawley Troxell with prejudice on June 3, 2010. R., p. 1736. 
Following the parties' stipulation to substitute Sharon Cummings as the personal 
representative of the Estate of Robert Turnbow as a proper party after Mr. Turnbow passed 
away, the district court granted an Order for substitution of parties on July 12,2012. R., p. 1778. 
On August 15, 2012, Riley, the Estate of Turnbow and Eberle Berlin filed renewed 
motions for summary judgment with supporting memorandums on the issue of the legal duty 
owed to a non-client by an attorney in a professional malpractice lawsuit following the Idaho 
Supreme Court's professional malpractice opinion in Taylor v. j\1cNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 
P .3d 642 (2010), an opinion issued after the district court's May 2010 Order. R., pp. 1864-1890 
and pp. 1801-1827. On August 15, 2012, Riley, the Estate of Turnbow and Eberle Berlin also 
requested the district court dismiss Taylor's Complaint pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata 
and, as a matter law, dismiss Taylor's complaint because Taylor had no damages proximately 
caused by the 1995 Opinion Letter in motions for summary judgment. Id. 
In support of his motion, Riley filed the Affidavits of Loren C. Ipsen (R., pp. 1891-1945), 
D. John Ashby (R., pp.1946-2151), and the second supplemental Affidavit of Richard Riley (R., 
pp. 2152-2433). The second supplemental Affidavit of Richard Riley includes complete copies 
of the trfu'1saction documents entered by AlA and Taylor in 1995 and 1996. In support of 
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their motion, the Estate of Turnbow and Eberle Berlin filed an Affidavit of Counsel CR., pp. 
1828-1831) attaching, among other things, a certified copy of Taylor's Washington State 
Complaint against his attorney Scott Bell for legal malpractice (R., pp. 1832-1847). 
Taylor filed opposition briefs to Riley, the Estate of Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's 
motions for summary judgment. R., pp. 2469 and 2444. His counsel also submitted three 
separate Affidavits of Counsel in opposition to the motions for summary judgment. R., pp. 
2434-2443, pp. 2494-2515, and pp. 2530-2555. 
Riley, the Estate of Turnbow and Eberle Berlin filed reply briefs in support of their 
motions for summary judgment. R., pp. 2516. After hearing oral arguments, the district court 
entered its Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment 
and Reconsideration and Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration on October 24, 2012 again 
denying Riley, the Estate of Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's motions for summary judgment. R., 
pp. 2556. With regard to the issue of the duty in the professional malpractice cause of action, the 
district court's October 24, 2012 Order referenced, re-affirmed and incorporated its May 10, 
2010 Order. Id. Thereafter, Riley, the Estate of Turnbow and Eberle Berlin filed their motions 
and memorandums seeking permission to appeal from the court's interlocutory order. R., pp. 
2572-2594. After receiving permission from this Court file an interlocutory appeal, Riley, the 
Estate of Turnbow and Eberle Berlin all filed timely notices of appeal. R., p. 2651-2662. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred in holding that Attorneys Riley a,.'1d Turnbow 
owed a non-client, Taylor, a legal duty even though no attorney-client relationship existed 
between them and whether the district court further erred in creating a never-before recognized 
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opinion-letter exception to the prerequisite requirement that an attorney-client relationship must 
exist to assert a professional malpractice claim. 
2. Whether the district court erred In finding that Taylor'S Complaint against 
Attorneys Riley and Turnbow and their respective law firm, Eberle Berlin, was not barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata. 
3. Whether the district court erred in denying the Estate of Turnbow and Eberle 
Berlin's motion for summary judgment when 1995 Opinion Letter ceased to proximately cause 
any damages, as a matter of law, when a subsequent contractual agreement superseded and 
replaced the contractual agreement for which the 1995 Opinion Letter was written. 
4. Whether the district court erred in concluding that any damages Taylor incurred 
were not proximately caused by his own action of executing the Subordination Agreement. 
5. Whether, in the event that the Estate of Turnbow and Eberle Berlin are the 
prevailing party on this appeal, they are entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-
120(3). 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The Estate of Turnbow and Eberle Berlin should be entitled to attorney fees on appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3). See Reynolds v. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A., 293 
P.3d 645, 650-651 (2013). The prevailing party may be entitled to attorney fees under Idaho 
Code § 12-120(3) an action for legal malpractice so long as a commercial transaction occurred 
between the prevailing party and the party from whom that party seeks fees. Soignier v. 
Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 326, 256 P.3d 730, 734 (2011). Further, Idaho Code § 12-120(3) 
applies where "a 'commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon 
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which the party is attempting to recover," and "[t]hus, as long as a commercial transaction is at 
the center of the lawsuit, the prevailing party may be entitled to attorney fees for claims that are 
fundamentally related to the commercial transaction yet sound in tort." Carrillo v. Boise Tire 
Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 755-56, 274 P.3d 1256, 1270-71 (2012) (quoting Blimka v. My Web 
Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 728, 152 P.3d 594, 599 (2007)). In this case, the facts 
discussed above, make it clear that a commercial transaction is integral to the claim and at the 
center ofthe lawsuit. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
A de novo review standard applies to appeals from an order of summary judgment. 
Reynolds v. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A., 293 P.3d 645, 650-651 (2013). The standard of 
review on appeal from summary judgment is the same standard as that used by the district court 
in ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Taylor v. ivfcNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 832, 243 
P.3d 642, 648 (2010). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." LR.C.P. 
56( c). "Ifthere is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question oflaw remains, over which 
this Court exercises free review." Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 307, 
160 P.3d 743, 746 (2007). See also Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 617, 619, 272 P.3d 1247, 1249 
(2012). 
Moreover, if the nonmoving party cannot make a showing on an element essential to his 
claim, "there can be no genuine issue of material fact since a complete failure of proof 
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concerning an essential element on the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts 
immaterial." j\1cGilvray v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., 136 Idaho 39, 42, 28 P.3d 380, 
383 (2001). Therefore, if the nonmoving party fails to provide a sufficient showing to establish 
the essential elements of his case, summary judgment shall be granted to the moving party. 
Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 403,195 P.3d 1212, 1216 (2008). 
B. Idaho case law does not support the imposition of a legal duty owed to a non-client 
whom the attorneys are not in privity with, giving rise to a cause of action for 
professional malpractice, in the context of attorneys authoring an opinion letter. 
Under Idaho law, an attorney-client relationship with the plaintiff is a prerequisite for 
holding the attorney liable for negligence in the performance of legal services, except in very 
narrow circumstance of an attorney preparing testamentary instruments. Harrigfeld v. Hancock 
(In re Order Certifying Question of Law), 140 Idaho 134, 137,90 P.3d 884,887 (2004) (holding 
that where, as a result of the attorney's negligence, the estate is not distributed in accordance 
with the testator's intent, the intended beneficiaries may maintain an action against the attorney). 
In recognizing the sole exception in Idaho law to the prerequisite requirement of the existence of 
an attorney-client relationship in the assertion a professional negligence cause of action against 
an attorney, the Harrigfeld court stated that the attorney's duty, a duty to his or her client, which 
arises out of the contract, must remain paramount, emphasized the limited scope of its ruling. 
Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho at 137,90 P.3d at 887. The Harrigfeld court further noted, citing Barcelo 
v. Elliott, 923 S.vV.2d 575, 578-79, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 607 (Tex. 1996), "the greater good is 
served by preserving a bright-line privity rule" and precluding a professional malpractice cause 
of action from those whom attorney did not represent. Id. at 887-888. Preserving a bright-
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line privity rule will ensure that attorneys may zealously represent their clients without the threat 
of suit from third parties compromising that representation. Id. at 888. 
In this case, in 2010, Attorneys Riley and Turnbow and their respective law firms moved 
for summary judgment on several issues, including Taylor's cause of action for negligent 
misrepresentation and on Taylor'S professional malpractice action. The district court granted 
Defendants' motions and dismissed Taylor's cause of action for negligent misrepresentation. R., 
pp. 1674-1675. The district court denied Defendants' motions on Taylor's cause of action for 
professional malpractice. R., p. 1684. In denying Defendants' motions on Taylor's professional 
malpractice action, the district court in May 2010 concluded there was no attorney-client 
relationship between the attorneys and Taylor, yet the Court nevertheless ruled that the attorneys 
owed the Taylor a legal duty in tort. R., p. 1684,11.8-9 and 21-22. 
In ruling that the Attorneys owed the Taylor a legal duty in tort, the district court 
acknowledged "this precise issue has not been addressed by Idaho Courts." R., p. 1684, 11.18-20. 
The district court nevertheless noted that New York law, specifically Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. 
v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 80 N.Y.2d 377,605 N.E.2d 318,590 N.Y.S.2d 
831 (1992), "was consistent with the reasoning of our Supreme Court in Harrigfeld." Id. Of 
note, in Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., under New York law, the New York court held that based on 
a theory of negligent representation a plaintiff may sue an attorney with whom the plaintiff is in 
privity with or is in "near-privity". See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 80 N.Y.2d 377, 382, 605 
N.E.2d 318,590 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1992). The district court's May 2010 ruling suggesting that 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am was consistent with the reasoning of our Supreme Court in Harrigfeld 
is erroneous for several reasons. 
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First, unlike New York, Idaho law does not recognize causes of action for negligent 
misrepresentation against attorneys. 1 In fact, the district court in this case, within the same 
hearing, expressly dismissed Taylor's cause of action for negligent misrepresentation against 
Attorneys Riley and Turnbow. R., pp. 1674-1675. 
Second, New York's practice of relaxing the standard of privity to include those in "near-
privity" in negligent misrepresentation claims is inconsistent with the reasoning set forth in 
Harrigfeld. In concluding that the greater good was served by preserving a bright-line privity 
rule in Idaho, the Harrigfeld court simultaneously acknowledged that, in 2004, the trend among 
its sister states was to relax the privity requirement. Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho at 137,90 P.3d at 887 
citing Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575, 580 (Tex. 1996) (Cornyn, J, dissenting). The court 
even noted that only four states followed the doctrine of law requiring strict privity, while the 
"overwhelming majority of jurisdictions" rejected the rule. Id. Notwithstanding that trend, the 
Harrigfeld court specifically, clearly and affirmatively rejected the logic and reasoning of those 
states adopting the new trend of relaxing the privity requirement in professional malpractice 
actions. 
Of interest, New York is actually one of the minority states requiring strict privity in the 
context of a professional malpractice action against an attorney (as opposed to in the context of a 
negligent misrepresentation cause of action against an attorney as reviewed by the district court). 
Zinnanti v 513 Woodward Ave. Realty, LLC, 105 A.D.3d 736, 737 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 
20l3) (under New York law, a third party, without privity, cannot maintain a claim against an 
1 The tort of negligent misrepresentation is not recognized in Idaho except in the narrow confines of a professional 
relationship involving an accountant. Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1010, 895 P.2d 
1195, 1203 (1995). 
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attorney in professional negligence, absent fraud, collusion, malicious acts or other special 
circumstances) . 
In fact, m a factually similar case in New York, a New York court dismissed a 
professional malpractice action against attorneys, granting the attorneys' summary judgment 
motion, in a lawsuit brought by a third-party, not in privity with the attorneys, to a commercial 
transaction who was alleging the attorneys negligently drafted an opinion letter. Council 
Commerce Corp. v. Schwartz, Sachs & Kamhi, P.e., 144 A.D.2d 422, 423-424 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2d Dep't 1988). In Schwartz, Sachs & Kamhi, P. e., the plaintiff entered into a loan agreement 
with the attorneys' clients, which was secured by the assignment of a leasehold interest. 
Schwartz, Sachs & Kamhi, P.C, 144 A.D.2d at 423. The loan transaction was somewhat 
complicated and the required authorization from the Bankruptcy Court, which the defendant 
attorneys secured for the plaintiff. Id. Later in time, the plaintiff and the defendant attorneys' 
clients entered into a second loan agreement. !d. Among the documentation prepared by the 
plaintiffs counsel for this second loan was an opinion letter, which was signed by the defendant 
attorneys. Id. The opinion letter contained representations to the effect that the consummation 
of this second transaction would not result in any breach or default of the terms of any agreement 
to which their clients were a party and did not require further consent or authorization from the 
clients' landlord. Id. Subsequently, the defendant attorneys' client's landlord objected to the 
filing of the leasehold mortgage, claiming a violation of its lease. Id. at 424. The plaintiff sued 
the defendant attorneys for alleged acts of malpractice, including the failure to properly advise 
the plaintiff in the opinion letter executed in connection with the second loan. Id. 
16 
In granting the defendant attorneys' motion for summary judgment, the New York court 
held the defendant attorneys cannot be held liable to the plaintiff, a non-client, for their alleged 
negligent preparation and execution of the opinion letter. Schwartz, Sachs & Kamhi, P. C, 144 
A.D.2d at 424. The New York court explained that defendant attorneys' execution of the 
opinion letter was performed in the course of representing their clients in the loan transactions 
and the firmly established rule is that an attorney is not liable to third parties not in privity for 
harm caused by the attorneys' professional negligence. Id. 
Schwartz, Sachs & Kamhi, P. C has several factual similarities to the case pending before 
this Court. The transactions involved in Schwartz, Sachs & Kamhi, P. C and this case both 
involved sophisticated commercial transactions with both of the parties to the transaction 
represented by separate counsel. In both cases, at the request of the plaintiffs counsel, the 
defendant attorneys executed an opinion letter opining on the soundness of the transaction. In 
Schwartz, Sachs & Kamhi, P. C, when the transaction worked out poorly for the plaintiff, he 
tried to sue the defendant attorneys for professional malpractice. However, the plaintiff in 
Schwartz, Sachs & Kamhi, P.C could not survive the attorneys' summary judgment challenge 
and had his case dismissed. Like the New York court in Schwartz, Sachs & Kamhi, P.C, this 
Court should reverse the district comi's ruling and similarly grant Riley, the Estate of Turnbow 
and Eberle Berlin's motions for summary judgment resulting in dismissal of Taylor's 
professional malpractice claim. 
In addition to erroneously concluding that Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. was consistent 
the reasoning of our Supreme Court in Harrigfeld, the district court further erred in its decision 
because, despite its acknowledgment that Idaho case law had never previously recognized a duty 
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owing to a non-client to draft an opinion letter in a non-negligent fashion, the district court failed 
to engage in a balancing-of-the-harms test in deciding to recognize a new duty or, alternatively, 
extend the duty beyond the scope previously imposed on attorneys. The Harrigfeld court, as 
several other cases before had, noted it was necessary for the court, when deciding whether to 
recognize a new duty or extend a duty beyond the scope previously imposed, to engage in a 
balancing-of-the-harms test. Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho at 138. See also Vincent v. Safeco Ins. Co. of 
Am., 136 Idaho 107,29 P.3d 943 (2001). 
Following the district court's May 2010 Order, this Court was again asked to expand the 
exception to prerequisite requirement of the existence of an attorney-client relationship it created 
in Harrigfeld. Taylor v. lv'JcNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010). Significantly, the 
McNichols decision was handed dovvn AFTER the district court rendered its May 2010 Order. 
The circumstances in the McNichols case were very similar to the circumstances in the case now 
before this Court. Reed Taylor was/is the Plaintiff in both cases. In both cases, Taylor 
urged/urges the Court to expand the Harrigfeld exception to the prerequisite requirement of the 
existence of an attorney-client relationship to create a duty to third-parties whom are not in 
privity with the attorney. Additionally, in both cases, our Court was asked/is being asked to 
follow law from another jurisdiction. 
In the McNichols case, quoting language from Harrigfeld and, noting that the principle 
set forth in Harrigfeld was reaffirmed in Taylor v. Afaile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005) 
(another case where Reed Taylor was the plaintiff), the Supreme Court said, "Reed cites to law 
from other jurisdictions, ignoring the well-established Idaho precedent, in arguing that third-
party beneficiaries to an attorney-client relationship may have standing to pursue malpractice 
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claims against an attorney." .i."Av1cNichols, 149 Idaho at 845. The Court continued "Reed offers no 
compelling reason why this court should expand its carefully reasoned analysis in Harrigfeld." 
Id. 
Of significance, the district court noted that the iV1cNichols decision was are-affirmation 
of Harrigfeld, but the district court attempted to distinguish j\1cNichols in stating that the re-
affirmation does not stand for the proposition that "there can be no other circumstance leading to 
attorney liability for negligence." R., pp. 2567-2568. While this statement is correct, it does not 
provide the necessary legal support for an expansion of duty thereby creating a wholly distinct 
exception from Harrigfeld to prerequisite requirement of the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship for a professional malpractice cause of action. 
In sum, the Idaho Supreme Court engaged in carefully reasoned analysis in reaching its 
decision in Harrigfeld and narrowly created an exception to the bright-line privity rule in Idaho. 
In 2010, Taylor could not offer a compelling reason for the Court to create an additional 
exemption to the prerequisite requirement of the existence of an attorney-client relationship in 
McNichols. Similarly, in this pending litigation, Taylor still cannot offer a "compelling reason" 
to ignore the well-established Idaho precedent. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the 
district court's duty ruling and grant summary judgment on the issue of duty in favor of 
Attorneys Riley and Turnbow and Eberle Berlin. 
C. As Taylor's prior litigation arises out of the same transaction or series of connected 
transactions, his claim for professional malpractice against Riley, Turnbow and 
Eberle Berlin in this litigation should be barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
Res judicata, also k.rlOvvn as claim preclusion, prevents a party from re-litigating issues 
which he litigated, or which he could have litigated, in a previous case with the same pa.rties or 
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their privies arising out of the same transaction or series of connected transactions. Ticor Title Co. 
v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 157 P .3d 613 (2007). The basic principle of res judicata is that a party 
has but one opportunity to put forth all his theories of recovery arising out of the same core facts. 
For claim preclusion to bar a subsequent action there are three requirements: (1) the same parties 
or privies; (2) the same claim; and (3) a final judgment. Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 124, 157 
P.3d 618. Idaho has adopted the "transactional" approach to claim preclusion, which means that 
"[i]n an action between the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the former adjudication 
concludes parties and privies not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat 
the claim but also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." 
Weldon v. Bonner County Tax Coalition, 124 Idaho 31, 855 P.2d 868, 872 (1993) (relying on 
Diamond v. Farmers Group, 119 Idaho 146, 804 P.2d 319,323 (1990)). In Diamond, the Idaho 
Supreme Court adopted the Restatement position that a valid and final judgment rendered in an 
action extinguishes all claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions out of 
which the cause of action arose. Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 151, 804 P.2d 
319,323 (1990) citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24, cmt. a (1982). As indicated, 
the doctrine of res judicata not only bars re-litigation of an issue for a party, but also those in privity 
with a party. Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618. Specifically, the term privity in 
itself does not state a reason for either including or excluding a person from the binding effect of 
a prior judgment, but rather it represents a legal conclusion that the relationship between the one 
who is a party on the record and the non-party is sufficiently close to afford application of the 
principle of preclusion. Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas International Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 
95 (5th Cir. Tex. 1977) citing Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Parties, 50 Iowa 
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L.Rev. 27 (1964). To be privies, a person not a party to the former action must "derive" his 
interest from one who was a party to it, that is, ... he [must be] in privity with a party to that 
judgment. Kite v. Eckley, 48 Idaho 454, 459, 282 P. 868, 869 (1929). Courts will often bind a 
non-party whose interests were represented adequately by a party in the original suit. Southwest 
Airlines Co. 546 F.2d at 95. See also Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46 (U.S. 
1912) (United States represents interests of American Indians); Kerrison v. Stewart, 93 U.S. 155 
(U.S. 1876) (trustee represents interests of beneficiaries); Berman v. Denver Tramway Corp., 
197 F.2d 946, 948 (10th Cir. Colo. 1952) (local government represents interests of the public). 
For example, in Brunacini v. Kavanagh, a New Mexico court addressed the doctrine of 
res judicata and privity as it applied to an attorney and a law firm. Brunacini v. Kavanagh, 117 
N.M. 122, 124, 869 P.2d 821, 823 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993). In Brunacini, an attorney prepared an 
opinion letter for a client. Brunacini, 117 N.M. at 123, 869 P.2d at 822. After relying on the 
opinion letter and taking action accordingly (i. e., discharging an employee with a written contract), 
the client was sued by its employee. Id. After defending the law firm's client, the employer, in the 
breach of contract suit allegedly arising from the opinion letter, the law firm sued to collect unpaid 
legal fees from the employer client, a matter that ultimately settled with a stipulated judgment. Id. 
at 124. The employer client then brought a malpractice suit against the specific lawyer who 
prepared the erroneous opinion letter. Id. In response to the parties' arguments in Brunacini, the 
court held that in the context of a res judicata argument, the attorney was in privity with the law 
firm because he was a member or employee of the firm at the time he performed the legal 
services that gave rise to the plaintiffs' allegations of legal malpractice. Id. at 126. also 
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Bentz v. Peterson, 107 N.M. 597, 600 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (privity exists when an individual is 
so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right). 
In this case, the facts clearly demonstrate that Riley and Turnbow worked jointly on 
revision, editing and finalizing the subject opinion letter. R., pp. 1850-1851. Riley and Turnbow 
were member attorneys of the same law firm. Under the doctrine of res judicata, Turnbow and 
Eberle Berlin should be found to be in privity with Riley. To the extent that res judicata bars 
further litigation against Riley, it similarly bars litigation against Turnbow, Riley's partner in 
drafting the opinion letter, and Riley's and Turnbow's joint firm, Eberle Berlin. Thus, Turnbow 
and Eberle Berlin have satisfied the first element of res judicata. 
As done at the district court level on summary judgment, the Estate of Turnbow and Eberle 
Berlin respectfully join in, adopt and incorporate herein by reference Riley's briefing on the 
application of the legal doctrine of res judicata, including as to the second and third elements of 
res judicata. R., pp. 1867-1879. Since the same transaction or series of connected transactions 
were involved in Hawley Troxell No.1 as in the present case, the case should be dismissed as a 
matter of law. With regard to the third element, final judgment was entered in Hawley Troxell No. 
1 on the merits in favor of Riley, thus satisfYing the "final judgment" requirement. Hence, Taylor's 
professional malpractice action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata and summary judgment 
should be entered in favor of Riley, the Estate of Turnbow and Eberle Berlin. 
D. Taylor cannot establish any damages proximately caused by the 1995 Opinion 
Letter and, accordingly, summary judgment should be entered in the Estate of 
Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's favor, thereby dismissing Taylor's remaining cause of 
action. 
As addressed above, the Estate of Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's motions for summary 
judgment also challenged the prima facie element of damages of Taylor's professional 
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malpractice cause of action. Specifically, the Estate of Turnbow and Eberle Berlin asserted that 
Taylor cannot establish any damages proximately caused by the 1995 Opinion Letter and the 
district court erred in denying the Estate of Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's motions. 
In this case, the district court's October 24, 2012 Order erroneously concluded that 
because the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement included a promissory note, which 
happened to be drafted in 1995, the 1995 Opinion Letter allegedly proximately cause Taylor's 
damages in this alleged professional malpractice case. Accordingly, this Court should reverse 
the district court and grant the Estate of Turnbow's and Eberle Berlin's motion for summary 
judgment. Reversal is appropriate. Taylor's alleged malpractice action should be dismissed 
because, as a matter of law, he has no recoverable damages proximately caused by the 1995 
Opinion Letter. 
As is illustrated in the record and clarified by the district court in 2012, the 1996 Stock 
Redemption Restmcture Agreement expressly provided that the 1996 Stock Redemption 
Restructure Agreement "superseded all other agreements," including the 1995 Stock Redemption 
Agreement, and the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement included a provision 
providing that the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and documents were "of no further force 
or effect." R., pp. 2163-2164 and pp. 2306-2313. The 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure 
Agreement wholly and completely replaced the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. R., pp. 
2163-2164 and pp. 2306-2313. Of significance, an Amended and Restated Security Agreement, 
an Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement and an Amended and Restated 
Noncompetition Agreement were executed in 1996. R., pp. 2163-2165. Also, the Consulting 
Agreement was terminated in 1996. Id. In addition to superseding and replacing the 1995 Stock 
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Redemption Agreement, the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement required that 
Taylor waive any claim to default under 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and forbear from 
exercising any remedies he may have had for any such default. R., p. 2312. Accordingly, after 
reviewing the contractual documents, the district court expressly held that in Taylor's lawsuit 
against AlA in 2007, he sued AlA on the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement, not 
the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. R., p. 2563. 
Nevertheless, in denying the Estate of Turnbows and Eberle Berlin's motions for 
summary judgment, the district court held that the Estate of Turnbow and Eberle Berlin's 
damage analysis was wrong (i.e., no damages were proximately caused by the 1995 Opinion 
Letter because Taylor entered a new contract, the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure 
Agreement, without an opinion authored by Eberle Berlin) because the 1996 Stock Redemption 
Restructure Agreement references the August 1, 1995 $6,000,000 promissory note, a document 
on which the 1995 Opinion Letter opined. The district court justified its denial of the summary 
judgment motion because "the promissory note was not superseded or replaced, but continued in 
effect." R., p. 2563. 
While it is clear that in entering the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement 
Taylor and AlA apparently agreed that AlA had an obligation to Taylor to pay interest on the 
unpaid balance of the $6,000,000 due and owing to Taylor and to pay the entire balance of the 
unpaid principle and any accrued but unpaid interest with ten years. However, despite the on-
going agreement that AlA had an obligation to pay Taylor, the actual wording and terms of the 
August 1, 1995 promissory note, in its entirety, cannot be deemed to be in force and in effect in 
the 1996 Stock Redemption Agreement, as the district court held in its October 24, 2012 Order. 
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As discussed herein, all of the documents underlying the August 1, 1995 promissory note 
were all "amended and restated" and the original forms of these underlying documents were 
superseded and were of "no further force or effect." Specifically, the August 1, 1995 promissory 
note stated that it was secured by the Stock Pledge Agreement and the Security Agreement. As 
is in clear in the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement, paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3, the 
documents supporting the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement (i. e., Amended and 
Restated Stock Pledge Agreement and Amended and Restated Security Agreement) contain 
different terms than the original Stock Pledge Agreement and the Security Agreement. The 
Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement expressly amends, restates, supersedes and 
replaces the Stock Pledge Agreement. The Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement 
changes the terms of the promissory note. For instance, the Amended and Restated Pledge 
Agreement permitted AlA to make partial or complete prepayment on the $6,000,000 obligation, 
whereas the actual terms of the August 1, 1995 promissory note expressly forbids prepayment 
without written consent of Taylor. The Amended and Restated Security Agreement also 
expressly amends, restates, supersedes and replaces the Security Agreement. There are 
numerous changes to the Amended and Restated Security Agreement, including but not limited 
to the involved parties (there are less in the Amended and Restated Security Agreement), the 
Amended and Restated Security Agreement addressed the $1.5 Million Down Payment 
Promissory Note and the Amended and Restated Security Agreement provided for a new and 
different arrangement relating to the location and disposition of Commission Collateral. Also, 
the Letter Agreement between AlA and Donna Taylor, dated January 11, 1995, was altered and 
new agreement terms entered when AlA and Reed and Donna Taylor executed the Series A 
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Preferred Shareholder Agreement in 1996, thereby reamortizing the redemption period for her 
preferred stock over a short period and changing the interest rate. 
Hence, to say the August 1, 1995 promissory note was not superseded or replaced, but 
continued in effect is erroneous and misleading. As discussed herein, the underlying and 
supporting documents changed the terms of the whole agreement and, importantly, the "terms" 
of the written August 1, 1995 promissory note (i. e., prepayment allowed at any point without 
written consent). Thus, while no new promissory note was signed in 1996, the terms set forth in 
the August 1, 1995 promissory note did not continue in its entirety in the 1996 Stock 
Redemption Restructure Agreement, without any change, as suggested by the district court. 
Additionally, the district court interpreted Judge Brudie's ruling too broadly III 
concluding that when Judge Brudie found the redemption illegal, such a finding necessarily 
included a finding that the promissory note was illegal. In the AlA litigation, in the context of 
addressing the soundness of the stock redemption agreement and arguments about the form of 
payment (i. e., credit/promissory note) being relevant to the application of Idaho Code § 30-1-6, 
Judge Brudie and the Court did find Idaho Code § 30-1-6 allows redemption stock on credit (i.e. 
via a promissory note), but the earned and capital surplus restrictions still applied. Taylor v. AlA 
Servs. Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 563,261 P.3d 829, 840 (2011). The Court continued "[n]othing in 
Idaho Code § 30-1-6 suggests that the timing of payment has any bearing on the statute's 
applicability [to a stock redemption agreement], and given the statute's purpose, it would be an 
absurd result to allow a corporation to get around these restrictions by simply paying on a later 
date." AlA Servs. Corp., 151 Idaho at 563,261 P.3d at 840. Accordingly, the Court's holding in 
AlA must be read in context of what was being addressed - the validity of the 1996 Stock 
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Redemption Restructure Agreement and the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement. Neither Judge 
Brudie nor the Supreme Court expressly held that August 1, 1995 promissory note was an 
"illegal contract" in AlA. 
The district court continued in explaining its denial of the summary judgment by stating 
"must as there is no opinion letter addressed to the 1996 transaction, there is nothing 
withdrawing the opinion as it relates to the promissory note." As discussed above, the negotiated 
restructure obligations undisputedly altered the obligations and terms of the August 1, 1995 
promissory note. The 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement makes it clear, through 
the expressed language of the contractual agreements, that it was the intent of Taylor and AlA to 
have the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement fully take the place of 1995 Stock 
Redemption Agreement. Simply said, the entry of the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure 
Agreement altered the contract terms. Hence, the district court cannot rely on the suggestion that 
because there was no withdrawal of the previously issued opinions in the 1995 Opinion Letter, 
the 1995 Opinion Letter should therefore be connected to the changed 1996 Stock Redemption 
Restructure Agreement and provide a basis for a professional malpractice claim against 
Attorneys Riley and Turnbow. The district court's analysis is wholly contrary to the terms of the 
1995 Opinion Letter (i.e., the letter addressed the 1995 "Transactional Documents" only). The 
district court's analysis is also contrary to the intent of the Taylor and AlA in entering into the 
1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement (i.e., amending, restating and superseding the 
1995 "Transactional Documents"). 
In further explaining its analysis, the district court stated, "when AlA couldn't pay on the 
1995 agreement a jury could certainly conclude restructuring the payment under the 1996 
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agreement was part of the 'natural and probable sequence,' of events arising from issuance of the 
opinion letter." R., p. 2565. In reaching its October 24,2012 holdings, the district court failed to 
account for its previous pronouncement with respect to Taylor's damages in this alleged 
malpractice action and the $6,000,000 promissory note. In its May 7, 2010 Order the district 
court held AlA's default on the promissory note (under either the 1995 or the 1996 agreement) 
did not constitute damage flowing from the 1995 Opinion Letter. R., p. 1688. The district court 
further explained "[i]t was not until the AlA litigation was underway that any loss occurred to 
Taylor that can be attributed to the erroneous opinion letter." ld. 
It is important to recognize and recall the recoverable damages in this alleged malpractice 
case are distinctly different from the damages which may have been recoverable in the AlA 
litigation. As the district court clarified in 2010, the allegedly "erroneous opinion letter did not 
cause [AlA's] default" and Taylor could not sue Attorneys Riley and Turnbow for AlA's failure 
to pay the note. Said differently, by virtue of drafting the 1995 Opinion Letter, Attorneys Riley 
and Turnbow did not become guarantors of AlA. 
Hence, as a matter of law, Taylor cannot establish any damages proximately caused by 
the 1995 Opinion Letter authored by Attorneys Riley and Turnbow and the district court erred in 
its denial of the motion for summary judgment. The district court erred in its attempts to find a 
causal damage link because, as discussed herein, the August 1, 1995 promissory note is in fact 
not unchanged and does not continue in the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement with 
the same terms which were addressed in the 1995 Opinion Letter. Additionally, the district 
court's overbroad interpretation of Judge Brudie's ruling in AlA incorrectly concluded that there 
had been a specific determination that the August 1, 1995 promissory note was an illegal contract 
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based on the terms of the promissory note. Moreover, the district court erred in its analysis the 
August 1, 1995 promissory note, addressed in the 1995 Opinion Letter, proximately caused 
Taylor damage in the AlA litigation. Accordingly, as discussed herein, as ~ matter of law, Taylor 
cannot establish any damages proximately caused by the 1995 Opinion Letter authored by 
Attorneys Riley and Turnbow and as such, summary judgment should be entered. 
E. The district court erred in concluding any damages Taylor incurred were not 
proximately caused by his own action of executing the Subordination Agreement. 
As discussed above, as a matter of law, the existence of the 1996 Stock Redemption 
Restructure Agreement precludes Taylor [rom having any damages in this lawsuit proximately 
caused by the 1995 Opinion Letter. Even if the Court reaches a different legal conclusion, 
Taylor'S own actions of executing a subordination agreement caused any such damages, not the 
1995 Opinion Letter. When the Opinion Letter was drafted, an agreement was in place that 
Donna Taylor's preferred stock would be redeemed first "to the extent that such redemption shall 
not violate the Idaho Business Corporation Act restrictions on the redemption of its own shares," 
(this is what the district court refers to as the "fail-safe clause") and only then would the 
outstanding balance due to Reed Taylor for the redemption of his stock become due. Mr. Riley's 
contemporaneous handwritten notes show that the following was taken into account in preparing 
the Opinion Letter: (1) the subordinated position of AlA's payment obligation to Reed Taylor's 
to that of AlA's payment obligation to Donna Taylor, and (2) the fact that the redemption of 
Donna Taylor's preferred shares shall not violate the Idaho Business Corporation Act restrictions 
on the redemption of its own shares. R., pp. 2166-2167. 
This issue represents an additional layer of the proximate cause/damage analysis 
weighing against Taylor. As discussed above, the district court has made it clear that the subject 
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of the AlA litigation was the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement. The 1995 Opinion 
Letter did not opine on the 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement, the document 
included in the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement, which addressed Donna 
Taylor's preferred stock. In its October 24, 2012 Order, the district court suggests that the 
subordination agreement is irrelevant because the subordination agreement "had nothing to do 
with the finding that the [1995J redemption agreement was illegal." The district court's 
statement confuses separate issues. 
In the context of the proximate cause of Taylor's damages in this professional 
malpractice litigation, even if this Court concludes Taylor's damage claim is not barred as a 
matter of law, as discussed above, any damages incurred by Taylor were proximately caused by 
his ovvn action of executing the subordination agreement, as opposed to any conduct of 
Attorneys Riley and Turnbow in 1995. Hence, to the extent that this Court has not concluded 
that the entry of summary judgment as a matter of law is appropriate against Taylor, Taylor's 
entry of the subrogation agreement with Donna Taylor provides additional grounds which 
preclude Taylor from establishing that he has any damages proximately caused by the subject 
1995 Opinion Letter. 
CONCLUSION 
The material facts of this case are not in dispute. As discussed herein, the district court 
incorrectly determined that Attorneys Riley and Turnbow owed a duty to Taylor, a non-client, 
that the doctrine of res judicata did not bar Taylor's Complaint and that Taylor's damages were 
proximately caused by the 1995 Opinion Letter. 
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Accordingly, the Estate of Turnbow and Eberle Berlin respectfully request that decisions 
of the district court be reversed and summary judgment be entered in their favor. The Estate of 
Turnbow and Eberle Berlin further respectfully request that they be awarded their attorney fees 
and costs incurred in this appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and other applicable law. 
DATED this 12th day of September, 2013. 
GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC 
BY~~ 
Jull e S. Hall, Of the FIrm 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants Sharon 
Cummings, Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Robert /'vl Turnbow and Eberle, 
Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, 
Chartered 
31 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 12th day of September, 2013, two (2) true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Appellants' Brief were served upon the following by email and U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Roderick Bond Law Office, PLLC 
800 Bellevue Way NE, Ste. 400 
Bellevue, W A 98004 
Michael D. Gaffney 
Beard, St. Clair, Gaffney PA 
2105 Coronado St. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, PA 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701-1539 
32 
